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Abstract
Recent research has shown the possibility of using smartphones’ sensors and accessories to extract some
behavioral attributes such as touch dynamics, keystroke dynamics and gait recognition. These attributes
are known as behavioral biometrics and could be used to verify or identify users implicitly and continuously
on smartphones. The authentication systems that have been built based on these behavioral biometric traits
are known as active or continuous authentication systems.
This paper provides a review of the active authentication systems. We present the components and the
operating process of the active authentication systems in general, followed by an overview of the state-of-the-
art behavioral biometric traits that used to develop an active authentication systems and their evaluation
on smartphones. We discuss the issues, strengths and limitations that associated with each behavioral
biometric trait. Also, we introduce a comparative summary between them. Finally, challenges and open
research problems are presented in this research field.
Keywords: Behavioral Biometric Authentication, Touch Dynamics, Keystroke Dynamics, Behavioral
Profiling, Gait Recognition
1. Introduction
With the diversity of sensors and services on
smartphone as shown in Figure 1, the smartphone
became more smarter and attracts both (1) users
who enjoy using it to facilitate their daily life more
than ever before, consequently they store more sen-
sitive and private information on it, and (2) attack-
ers who pay more attention to access or steal these
sensitive data. These attacks could be done by ei-
ther insider attacker, someone who know the user
such as friend or family member or stranger at-
tacker, someone who does not know the user [2].
Due to the weaknesses of the traditional authenti-
cation mechanisms such as PIN, Pattern and Pass-
word, and the biometric based mechanisms such
as fingerprint, face and voice recognition on smart-
phones, the research community have developed au-
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thentication mechanisms based on behavioral bio-
metric traits such as gesture, keystroke and gait.
These mechanisms are known as active or continu-
ous authentication mechanisms.
In this paper we present the components and
the operating process of the active authentication
mechanisms in general, followed by some different
metrics that used to evaluate the performance of
an active authentication mechanisms. We also con-
ducted an extensive survey of the state-of-the-art
active authentication systems and their evaluation
on smartphones. We discuss the issues, strengths
and limitations that associated with each behav-
ioral biometric trait, and introduce a comparative
analysis between them. Finally, we identify chal-
lenges, open research problems and provide a set of
recommendations in this research field.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 3 provides an overview of active authentica-
tion systems in general. Section 4 presents a set
of factors that facilitate the selection of a behav-
ioral biometric trait. Section 5 presents another
set of factors that help in the designing process of
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Figure 1: Sensors, services and devices in smartphones that could be used to make a person recognition based on
physiological and behavioral traits [1].
the biometric authentication system. Section 6 sur-
veys the common behavioral biometric traits. Sec-
tion 8 presents some limitations and followed by set
of challenges and future trends.
2. Adversary Attacks
The main goal of attackers is to gain physical
access to the victim’s device for snooping or data
destruction. These attacks could be done by either
insider attacker or stranger attacker [2].
Insider Attacker, someone who know the
user such as friend or family member. The insider
attacker has opportunity to have unauthorized
access to the victim’s device due to the proximity
between them. Based on a previous research done
by Usmani et al. [3] where they characterized the
social insider attacks and found that the existing
devices ( i.e., which use the traditional authentica-
tion methods such as Pattern or Password) and the
Facebook account security measures are ineffective
to resist social insider attacks.
Stranger Attacker, someone who does not
know the user. The stranger attacker has no prior
knowledge about the victim, who may steal the
legitimate user’s device or found a lost device.
3. The Active Authentication
In this section we define what is an active au-
thentication and show an overview on how does the
active authentication system work, followed by its
modes of operation. Finally, we present different
metrics that have been used to evaluate the perfor-
mance of active authentication systems.
3.1. What is an active authentication system?
Active authentication system is an automated
recognition process that verifies or identify individ-
uals based on detailed information about their body
such as face or their behaviors such as how they
type or interact with some sensors on smartphone.
Figure 1 shows some sensors and services that can
be used to acquire behavioral biometric data. The
main goal of the recognition process is to prevent
the unauthorized access from imposters and grant
access only for legitimate user. The idea behind
the recognition process in active authentication sys-
tem is to establish an identity based on who you
are? concept. The details of how recognition pro-
cess work based on a specific biometric trait will be
described in the next section.
There are two important characteristics that
should be achieved by any active authentication
system which are as follows:
• Continuity: A smartphone verifying user in
a continuous manner, where the authentication
system keep authenticating users as long as the
user uses the smartphone. In other words, it is a
re-authentication process that conducts periodi-
cally.
• Transparency: All authentication processes
should be carried out in the background without
interrupting the user (i.e., user will be implicitly
authenticated without any intervention).
The two aforementioned characteristics are repre-
senting the cornerstone of any active authentication
system, which make it different than the traditional
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Figure 2: The operation of a biometric recognition system.
authentication system. There are different biomet-
ric techniques could be used to achieve these charac-
teristics. These techniques are categorized into two
groups, physiological biometric mechanisms such as
face and voice recognition, and behavioral biometric
mechanisms such as touch and keystroke dynamics.
In this paper we concentrate on surveying the be-
havioral biometric ones.
3.2. How does the active authentication system
work?
The active authentication system works similarly
like the biometric recognition system, which con-
tains two main phases, enrolment phase and recog-
nition phase as shown in Figure 2. In the enrolment
phase, the system acquires the biometric data, an-
alyzes this data and extracts a distinctive features
set, then it builds the feature templates (e.g., like
the training process for a classifier). In the recogni-
tion phase, the system, similarly, acquires biometric
data and extracts features, but instead of storing
these features in the feature templates, it compares
it with the stored one to verify the user identity.
There is a set of basic modules should be in-
cluded in any active authentication system in gen-
eral which are as follows:
1. Data acquisition module: it is the first step in
the system where the raw biometric data is col-
lected by one of the sensors in the smartphone
such as camera or touchscreen sensor (see Fig-
ure 1). The quality of the collected data is very
important because it will affect on the successor
modules of the recognition process. The quality
of data is impacted by the used sensors and the
environment in which the data was collected [4].
2. Feature extraction module: before extract-
ing the distinctive features, the raw data has
to be preprocessed, detect and remove outliers,
improve the data quality, especially if the data
collected in an uncontrolled environment with
uncooperative users. Then, once the data is
cleaned and processed, set of discriminative fea-
tures are extracted. The extracted features de-
pend on the type of raw data, for example if
the collected data contains timestamps, tempo-
ral feature could be extracted.
3. Feature templates: it is a repository database
that contains a concatenation of the extracted
feature vectors for a specific user (i.e., device
owner). It is built during the enrollment phase
and used during the recognition phase to be com-
pared with the captured feature sample to verify
the claimed identity.
4. Matching and decision-making module: it
used only during the recognition process, where
it compares the extracted features against the
stored feature templates to generate a matching
score to make a decision. The decision validates
the claimed identity to see it is done by legiti-
mate user or imposter.
3.3. Modes of operation
There are two different modes that the biometric
system could operate, which depends on the recog-
nition context mode, verification or identification.
3.3.1. Verification mode
In verification mode, which is one-to-one match-
ing process, the system verifies the claimed iden-
tity by comparing it with the stored one. If the
matching score of the claimed identity greater than
a predefined threshold α ∈ (0, 1), then the claimed
identity is accepted as legitimate, otherwise, the
claimed identity is rejected as imposter. So, au-
thentication process could be operate based on ver-
ification mode and implemented as a binary clas-
sification problem. The decision rule is calculated
based on the following formula:
p(ui) =
{
legitimate if p(ui) > α
imposter if p(ui) < α
(1)
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where p(ui) represents the authentication score for
a user ui and is calculated by the classifier, and α
represents a predefined threshold ∈ (0, 1).
3.3.2. Identification mode
In identification mode, which is one-to-many
matching process, the system recognizes the pre-
sented biometric sample by comparing it with all
stored templates (i.e., a template for each user),
where the matching algorithm estimates the iden-
tity of the sample based on the highest matching
score and a designated threshold (i.e., there is mul-
tiple matching scores will be generated, one for each
user, in which the highest score will be selected).
3.4. Performance metrics
There are different metrics could be used to eval-
uate the performance of an active authentication
system. Selecting metrics depends on the type of
evaluation, and there are three types of evaluation
could be performed:
1. Technology evaluation: is the dominant gen-
eral type of evaluation testing. It is used to eval-
uate the same biometric modality in offline mode
and compares different algorithms within a sin-
gle modality on a fixed dataset.
2. Scenario evaluation: the main objective of
this evaluation type is to test the whole biomet-
ric system for a class of applications in a real
world manner where the dataset collected from
real subjects.
3. Operational evaluation: it is similar to sce-
nario evaluation but it measures a comprehen-
sive biometric system in specific application en-
vironment in a real-time manner.
Because our application context here is authenti-
cation, we describe the metrics that could be used in
verification mode rather than identification mode.
Our assumption is that each mobile device is used
only by one user (i.e., single user context) and our
goal is to prevent the unauthorized access by differ-
entiating between the legitimate user and imposter
(i.e., binary-class classification problem).
The basic metrics that used to evaluate the ac-
tive authentication system are depending on the er-
ror rates. Before describing the verification system
error rates, we are going to mention some basic met-
rics that will be used in verification error calcula-
tion.
The raw basic metrics and their description in
our problem domain are as follows:
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Figure 3: The performance of a biometric system
can be summarized using Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic (ROC). In this figure, the performance curves
are computed using different biometric traits (Gesture,
Keystroke, Profile sensors). ROC curves plots TAR
along the y-axis and FAR along the x-axis. The area
under the curve (AUC) is used to quantify the qual-
ity of the authentication model as an alternative to the
accuracy.
• True Accept (TA): The system correctly
matches a genuine user to the corresponding tem-
plate stored within the system.
• True Reject (TR): The system correctly denies
an imposter, where its data that not matching to
any template within the system.
• False Accept (FA): The impostor was incor-
rectly matched to a genuine user template stored
within a biometric system.
• False Reject (FR): The genuine user is incor-
rectly rejected from the system.
The common metrics that have been used in the
literature to evaluate the performance of the active
authentication system are as follows:
• True Accept Rate (TAR) describes the prob-
ability that the system correctly matches a gen-
uine user to the corresponding stored template
within the system, and is calculated based on the
following formula:
TAR =
TA
TA+ FR
(2)
• False Accept Rate (FAR) describes the
proportion of impostors that were incorrectly
matched to a genuine users templates stored in a
biometric system, and is calculated based on the
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following formula:
FAR =
FA
FA+ TR
(3)
FAR reflects the ability of a non-authorized user
to access the system, whether via zero-effort ac-
cess attempts or deliberate spoofing or any other
method of circumvention.
• False Reject Rate (FRR) describes the pro-
portion of genuine users that were incorrectly re-
jected from a biometric system, and is calculated
based on the following formula:
FRR =
FR
TA+ FR
(4)
• Equal Error Rate (EER): describes the point
at which genuine and imposter error rates are
equal, where the lower EER indicates better per-
formance. It could be used to summarize the
performance of the authentication system in a
single value result. Previous research has been
conducted to calculate it with respect to energy
consumption. For instance, Sitova et al., [5]
proposed an evaluation for the active behavioral
biometric authentication system based on EERs
with respect to various levels of energy consump-
tion.
Also, there are two important metrics that could
be used to describe the authentication performance
of the system in a presented curve:
• Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
Curve: depicts the trade-off between TAR along
the y-axis and FAR along the x-axis in a single
curve at various threshold values, where points
are plotted parametrically as a function of the de-
cision threshold (see Figure 3). The top left cor-
ner of the plot represents the ideal point, where
TPR equal one and FPR equal zero.
• Area Under Curve (AUC): it is used to quan-
tify the quality of the authentication model as an
alternative to the accuracy (see Figure 3). Also
it is useful even when there is a high class im-
balance (i.e. one of the classes dominates). The
value of AUC ranges from 0.5 to 1, where 0.5 rep-
resents the random guessing and 1 represents the
ideal results (i.e., no errors in the system).
4. The Selection of The Biometric Trait
There are different biometric traits could be used
in active authentication system which relies on the
application context. Each trait could be used in
certain context but others not. There are some fac-
tors could be used to evaluate the suitability of the
biometric trait which are as follows [6]:
• Universality: each user should have the biomet-
ric trait.
• Uniqueness: the biometric trait should be ad-
equately differentiates between any two users.
This will help to generate a discriminative fea-
tures that could be used to differentiate between
legitimate user and imposter with high accuracy.
• Permanence: the biometric trait should be
durable (i.e., not vary over time).
• Collectability: the biometric trait should be
easy to collect and measure.
• Performance: the accuracy of the biometric
trait should be robust and functional for the
given environment.
• Acceptability: the users should accept and will-
ing to present her biometric trait.
• Circumvention: the biometric trait should not
be susceptible to spoofing or any other attacks.
5. Design Factors
The design of the biometric authentication sys-
tem is influenced by some factors [4], we describe
them in regard to mobile application environment
which are as follows:
• User cooperation: Cooperation refers to the
behavior of the user when interacting with the
authentication system, where the biometric trait
is collected either from cooperative user, where
the user interacts with the system in concerted
manner, or uncooperative user, where the user
does not perform the trait as it should be.
• The degree of control: the degree to which a
deployment environment is controlled or uncon-
trolled; whether the deployment environment is
outdoors, indoors, or mixed.
• User awareness: explores if user is aware that
he is being subjected to biometric recognition
system or not.
• The habituation: explores if the user has ex-
perience to interact with the biometric system
before or not.
• Open versus closed system: explores If a per-
son’s biometric template can be used across mul-
tiple applications, in this case the system is open,
otherwise, the system is closed.
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6. Common Behavioral Biometric Traits
Behavioral biometric trait is a particular char-
acteristics that can be acquired from user actions
such as touch gesture, keystroke dynamics or be-
havioral profiling (See Figure 4). In this section we
present a review about some of the commonly used
behavioral biometric traits that have been proposed
in the literature to design an active authentication
systems on smartphones.
6.1. Gesture based authentication
All gesture based authentication methods are
built based on the analysis and measuring of touch
gestures on smartphones [9]. The touch gesture bio-
metric trait is a hand drawn shape on the smart-
phone touch screen that contains one or more
strokes. The stroke is a sequence of consecutive
timed points. Each point represented by an ordered
pair of numerical coordinates as shown in Figure 4a.
Smartphone touch screen represents the input data
source for gesture based authentication, which is
the main input method used in the smartphones.
Touch gestures could be acquired from application
level [10] or operating system level [11]. Every
touch gesture includes touch mechanics which de-
picts what your fingers do on the screen?, and touch
activities which depicts the results of specific ges-
tures [9].
A useful discriminative set of features could be
extracted from the touch gesture biometric trait,
but at the same time, it also introduces some chal-
lenges. We are going to discuss how touch gesture
biometric trait has been used to develop an active
authentication system.
6.1.1. Data collection
Data collection is the first step in the active au-
thentication system, and the raw touch data is ac-
quired from the touchscreen sensor. The behav-
ior of touch gesture techniques is determined by a
transfer function [19] that converts human input ac-
tions attached with some parameters such as (size,
length, speed, velocity, pressure, or direction) into
a gesture output effect. Most of proposed gesture
authentication system in the literature are based on
the assumption that the users are going to perform
the touch gestures in away that reflects their be-
haviors. Hence, the parameters that attached with
the touch input vary from one user to another.
Touch gesture biometric trait has been used in ac-
tive authentication systems because it implies two
important characteristics:
• Continuity: Touch gesture biometric trait can
be used to continuously authenticate users by
monitoring their touch dynamics patterns. Users
can be re-authenticated as long as they are us-
ing the smartphone. This is one of the most im-
portant advantages that touch gesture biometric
trait has. Specially when compare it with the
traditional authentication methods and physio-
logical biometrics.
• Transparency: Touch gesture biometric trait
could be acquired without any interruption to the
user. This is because the acquiring and process-
ing of touch gestures can be carried out in the
background while the smartphone being used by
the user.
As illustrated in Table 1, the majority of con-
ducted studies have collected data from less than
or equal 50 participants [12, 13, 15, 16, 17]. On
the other hand, few studies have conducted with a
larger number of participants as in [14, 18]. The
majority of formulated datasets contain hundreds
of samples per user and were collected during a lab
study from cooperative users in controlled environ-
ment [20].
Regarding to the platform that used during data
collection process, Android was the most common
platform used for touch gesture biometric acquisi-
tion, due to its popularity in the market shares and
it is easier to customize than iOS or Windows.
6.1.2. Feature extraction
Feature extraction is one of the main modules
used in active authentication system, where the
classifier classifies the users based on features set.
The main goal of feature extraction is to identify
and extract discriminative set of features by ana-
lyzing the raw touch gesture data from the users.
The common extracted features were belonged to
the following categories:
• Temporal features: one of the common used
features set in touch gesture authentication sys-
tem. Extracting this features set relies on the
time analysis of user touches, where every touch
gesture event is attached with timestamp. For
example, the total time taken to perform a touch
gesture could be calculated based on the differ-
ence between touch down and touch up times-
tamps, and we can use that calculated duration
as a temporal feature.
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Figure 4: Examples of behavioral biometric traits that have been used for active authentication. It includes (a)
touch gesture, (b) gait [7], (c) keystroke dynamics [8] and (d) behavioral profiling.
Study # of Par-
ticipants
Dataset (# of samples) Platform # of features Classification Performance(%)
Shahzad et al. [12] 50 Private (15009 overall) Windows 7 SVDE EER:0.5
Zhao et al., [13] 30 Private(120/user) Android Image (100x150) NC,L1,L2 distance EER:2.62
Serwadda et al. [14] 190 Private(50/touch type) Android 28 10 Classifiers EER:10.5-42.0
Xu et al. [15] 42 Private(200/user) Android (4,37,42,49) SVM EER:<10.0
Feng et al. [16] 40 Private(-) Android 53 DT, RF, BN FAR:4.66, FRR:0.13
Frank et al. [17] 41 Private(-) Android 27 KNN, SVM EER:<4.0
Li et al. [18] 75 Private(400/user) Android 10 SVM EER 3.0
Table 1: Gesture based authentication methods. It contains the-state-of-the-art studies that conducted to develop
touch-based active authentication systems. Number of Participants depicts how many participants contributed to
the study. Dataset contains status of the collected data, private or public. The platform OS in where the study
conducted. Number of features that extracted from the collected data. Classifiers that used in the classification
process. Finally, the best results that achieved by the developed method, where some studies evaluated based on
EER and others based on FAR and FRR.
• Spatial features: extracted by doing analysis
relating to the position, area, and size of the
touch gesture, where every touch gesture is per-
formed in specific position on the touch screen
and represented by x, y coordinates. Also touch
size can be used which represents the approxi-
mation of the screen area that is being touched
during a touch event. Another spatial feature
which is touch pressure, a value measures the ap-
proximated force asserted on the screen for each
touch event.
• Dynamic features: extracted from the dy-
namic analysis of the touch event. For example
the touch gesture is detected by the motion of
object (i.e., finger) on the touch screen. By ana-
lyzing this motion helps to generate a useful set
of features that could be used to differentiate be-
tween users.
• Geometric features: extracted by conducting
a geometric analysis on the touch gesture. As
the touch gesture contains one or more strokes
and the stroke is a sequence of consecutive timed
points. Analyzing the relationships between
points, lines, curves that generated by conducting
touch gestures give a useful discriminative fea-
tures.
6.1.3. Evaluation
The evaluation of touch gesture biometric trait
in the literature is based on verification mode (i.e.,
one-to-one matching) [21], where the user claim the
identity and the system validates the claimed pre-
sented identity. The following are set of components
that affect on the evaluation process:
• Dataset: The dataset sample size has a huge im-
pact on the accuracy of any proposed authentica-
tion method. Based on the literature, the major-
ity of conducted studies collected small samples
(i.e., hundreds per user as shown in Table 1) such
as in [13, 14, 15, 18]. On the other hand, there are
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few studies that collected thousands of samples
such as in [12]. Evaluating the performance of a
proposed active authentication system on large-
scale dataset that contains millions of samples is
going to be more realistic than using small-size
datasets.
• Classification model: different classification
methods have been used in the touch gesture au-
thentication. Some of them were based on proba-
bilistic modelling such as Bayesian Network [16],
and others used Support Vector Machine (SVM),
which is another classification technique that sep-
arates the feature space by a hyperplane such
that the margin between the two classes is max-
imized [18, 17]. One of the most common used
classification technique in touch gesture authen-
tication systems is K-nearest-neighbors (KNN)
which is robust and fast classification method
that takes every new observation and locates it
in feature space with respect to all training ob-
servations. Also, Decision Tree has been used to
classify data based on the learned touch patterns
as in [16].
• Static and dynamic modes: In the static
mode, the identity of a subject is verified based
on the input provided by the subject on the first
instance of accessing a system. In the dynamic
mode, a subject’s identity is continuously verified
throughout the active session of a mobile device.
• Metrics: Equal Error Rate (EER) is the most
common used metric in the literature to evaluate
the performance of the touch gesture authentica-
tion. Table 1 shows a comparison between the
performance of different proposed active authen-
tication systems. As we can see the most pro-
posed systems achieve low EER values based on
their collected datasets which are less than 10%.
Some proposed systems use other metrics such
as Area Under The CurveAUC [12], False Re-
jection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate
(FAR) [16], for more declaration about the most
common used metrics see section 3.4.
6.2. Keystroke dynamics
Keystroke dynamics is one of the old behavioral
biometric trait that have been proposed for a long
time to authenticate user continuously on comput-
ers [27, 28, 26]. For smartphones, keystroke dy-
namics is the process of analyzing the way a user
types on smartphone virtual keyboard by moni-
toring the keyboard inputs as shown in Figure 5,
and attempts to identify them based on habitual
Figure 5: Screenshot from the virtual soft keyboard
comparing user typing patterns. It shows the presses
different locations done by two users, the normal user
(grey dots) and other user (yellow dots). Image ob-
tained from KeySens [22].
rhythm patterns in the way they type. With the di-
versity of touchscreen smartphones, the way a user
types on smartphone has changed to be easier and
more friendly. At the same time the raw data that
associated with keystroke analysis became boarder
and opened opportunity to collect more data and
extract set of discriminative features that can be
used to authenticate smartphone user based on the
way they type (keystroke dynamics). Based on the
literature, we present how the data that relates to
keystroke dynamics collected, followed by a descrip-
tion on extracted features set. Then, we discuss
the evaluation techniques that have been used in
the literature to evaluate the performance of the
active authentication methods that built based on
keystroke dynamics.
6.2.1. Data collection
Most research in the field of keystroke analysis
collect data from structured and predefined text.
For instance, Clarke et al. [25] asked participants
to enter 30 text messages over three sessions. The
messages contained mixture of quotes, lines from
movies and typical text messages. Length of mes-
sages varied with average 14 words per message.
Similarly, Feng et al. [24] developed an android ap-
plication to collect keystrokes over login session,
where user asked to enter passwords (i.e., length is
4, 20 different passwords were used), and post-login
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Study # of Sub-
jects
Dataset (# of
sample)
Platform # of fea-
tures
Classification Performance(%)
Buschek et al. [8] 28 Private(20160
overall)
Android 24 Knn,SVM,NB,LSAD EER:26.4-36.8
Draffin et al. [22] 13 Private(430000) Android 6 Neural Networks FAR:14, FRR:2.2
Trojahn et al. [23] 18 Private(1980) Android 32 J48 Decision Tree FAR:2.03, FRR:2.67
Feng et al. [24] 40 Private(-) Android 122 J48,RF,BN FAR:1.0,FRR1.0
Clarke et al. [25] 30 Private(30) - - GRNN, RBF, FF MLP EER:12.8
Gunetti et al. [26] 205 Private(-) HTML form - Mathematical Model FAR:5.0,FRR:0.5
Table 2: Keystroke based authentication methods. It contains the-state-of-the-art studies that conducted to develop
Keystroke-based active authentication systems. Number of subjects depicts how many participants contributed to
the study. Dataset contains status of the collected data, private or public. The platform OS in where the study
conducted. Number of features that extracted from the collected data. Classifiers that used in the classification
process. Finally, the best results that achieved by the developed method. Abbreviation used: Least Squares Anomaly
Detection (LSAD), Naive Bayes (NB), Support Vector Machine (SVM), J48 Decision Tree (J48), Random Forest
(RF), Bayes Net (BN), k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN), Equal Error Rate (EER), False Rejection Rate (FRR) and
False Acceptance Rate (FAR), Generalized regression neural networks (GRNNs), Radial basis function (RBF), Feed
forward multi-layered perceptrons (FF MLPs)
session, where the user asked to enter a predefined
sentences (i.e., the length of sentences varies from
14 words to 53 words, and on average 23 words).
Trojahn et al. [23] also asked users to enter a spec-
ified sentence with 11 characters ten times (two
words with one space in between). Buschek et al. [8]
invited participants to spend two sessions, with a
gap of at least one week. Each session comprised
three main tasks where the participants typed 6 dif-
ferent passwords in random order, 20 times each.
As we can see, all aforementioned techniques relies
on a specific context with a predefined text.
On the other hand, few studies have been con-
ducted to collect data over all usage context i.e.,
not restricted with some predefined sentences or
password. Draffin et al. [22] conducted a real-
world field study to collect keystrokes from 13 users
over three weeks period. They collected 86000 key-
presses overall context without any intervention,
not just from passwords or controlled phrases.
Similar to touch gesture, the keystroke dynamics
can be used in active authentication systems be-
cause it implies two important characteristics:
• Continuity: keystroke dynamics can be used to
continuously authenticate smartphone users by
monitoring their way of typing, where the users
can be re-authenticated as long as they type on
the virtual keyboard. This is one of the most im-
portant advantages that keystroke dynamics has,
specially when compare it with the physiological
biometric traits.
• Transparency: keystroke dynamics could be ac-
quired implicitly while the users type without any
interruption to them. This is because the acquir-
ing and processing of touch gestures can be con-
ducted in the background while the smartphone
being used by the user.
6.2.2. Extracted features
Different features can be extracted from
keystroke analysis. The most common used fea-
tures in the literature of keystroke analysis are the
duration and latency of the keypresses. The dura-
tion represents the amount of time between press
and release of a key, and the latency is calculated
based on the elapsed time difference between the
release of the previous key and the press of the
current key. Some other features are relevant to
touch gesture as described in section 6.1.2 such as
spatial features (i.e., features relate to the position,
area, pressure and size of the keystroke presses).
6.2.3. Evaluation
Most of the evaluation methods in the literature
are based on verification mode such as in [29, 8, 24],
some other little evaluation methods have been used
based on identification mode such as in [30].
Table 2 compares different proposed active au-
thentication methods based on keystroke dynam-
ics. Buschek et al. [8] evaluated their proposed au-
thentication mechanism on a private dataset with
20160 samples. They used different models to make
verification. First they used classification models
such as KNN, NB and SVM. Second, they used
anomaly detection model such as LSAD [31] and
they found that the classification models performed
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better than anomaly detection model. Overall the
system they reduced EER by 26.4 - 36.8%. Tro-
jahn et al. [23] formulated a dataset of 1980 samples
collected from 18 users. They used different classi-
fication algorithm such as J48 decision tree, MLP,
BayesNet and Naive Bayes. The best result for FAR
and FRR error rates achieved by the J48 classifiers
which were 2.03% and 2.67% respectively. Feng et
al. [24] evaluated the system on a dataset collected
from 40 subjects. They have used three classifiers,
DT, RF and BN. The best FAR was achieved by RF
which was 8.93% and the best FRR was achieved by
BN which was 0.27%. Clarke et al. [25] evaluated
their system based on dataset of 30 samples col-
lected from 30 subjects over three sessions. Their
EER was 12.8% on average which achieved by neu-
ral network classifiers. In contrast with all men-
tioned evaluation methods, Draffin et al. [22] evalu-
ated their proposed system based on unconstrained
dataset (i.e., they collected data overall application
context without intervention or any supervision like
what other studies did). The best result achieved
by evaluating the system over input sessions of 15
keypresses with detection rate 67.7%, where FAR
was 14.0% and FRR was 2.2%, they built a dis-
criminant algorithm based on neural networks.
6.3. Behavioral profiling
Behavioral Profiling is the way in which the user
interacts with the mobile sensors and services. Ac-
tive authentication systems leverage these interac-
tions to verify the user identity. It has been used
for a long time to authenticate users based on their
behavioral profile, where the literature of behav-
ioral profiling was concentrated on network-based
approaches such as user calling and service provider
network to build a user profile [37]. Also, some host-
based approaches such as application usage and lo-
cations were used [38]. The intuition behind au-
thentication system based on behavioral profiling is
to build a profile of user activities over a period of
time and compare that profile with the current user
profile using some machine learning approaches.
Some recent active authentication techniques
have been developed based on bahvioral profiling
such as in [32, 33, 34, 35]. Regarding these meth-
ods, we show what is the collected data and how
they collect these data. Also, we discuss the fea-
ture extraction process in addition to the evaluation
methods.
6.3.1. Data collection
One of the most common public dataset that have
been used in the literature of behavioral profiling
authentication is MIT Reality dataset [39]. The
MIT Reality dataset contains a rich amount of be-
havioral profiles sensors for 100 smartphone users
from various departments of MIT. The data col-
lected over the period of 9 months and contains
sensor data such as call logs, bluetooth devices in
proximity, cell tower IDs, application usage. Some
proposed authentication system used MIT Reality
dataset such as in [32, 33, 40]. Other proposed sys-
tems have collected data by conducting a study.
The evaluation results done by Li et al. [32] on the
MIT Reality dataset achieved FRR of 11.45% and
FAR of 4.17% overall the proposed framework.
Kayacik et al. [33] proposed a data driven tech-
nique that compares the current user profile with
the stored one. If the behaviour deviates sufficiently
from the established norm, actions such as explicit
authentication can be triggered. They evaluated
the proposed system using three datasets, GCU,
Rice Livelab and MIT Reality. GCU dataset con-
sists of a collection from 7 staff and students of
Glasgow Caledonian University. It was collected
in 2013 from Android devices and contains sensor
data from wifi networks, cell towers, application
use, light and sound levels and device system stats.
The duration of the data varies from 2 weeks to 14
weeks for different users. Rice Livelab [41] dataset
was built over 35 users, all of them were students
at Rice University or Houston Community College.
The data was collected from iPhone 3GS devices
between 2010 and 2011 and contains sensor data
such as application use, wifi networks, cell tower
IDs, GPS readings, battery usage and accelerome-
ter output. The duration of the data varies from a
few days to less than one year for different users.
Shi et al. [36] developed a data collection appli-
cation and posted it in Android marketplace. It
has been downloaded by 276 users but only 50
users who kept it for a period of 12 days or more.
They formulated their dataset based on the 50 users
and they evaluated their proposed algorithm based
on them. The dataset contains SMS, Phone calls,
Browser history and Location. They used only two
metrics to evaluate the proposed algorithm. First
metric is the number of times the legitimate user
used the device before a failed authentication. Sec-
ond metric is the number of times the adversary
used the device before detection.
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Study # of Sub-
jects
Dataset Features Classification Performance (%)
Li et al. [32] 22-76 MIT Reality app name, Tel. number,
cell, location, call (dura-
tion, time)
Neural Network FRR:11.45, FAR:4.17
Kayacik et al. [33] 7,35,100 GCU,RiceLivelab,
MIT Reality
+ wifi, cpu load, light,
noise ,magnetic field and
rotation
PDF DR: 53-99
Bassu et al. [34] NA Private app usage, time, loca-
tion, HDI, bandwidth
Bayesian NA
Gupta et al. [35] 37-76 MIT Reality GPS location, WIFI,
bluetooth
Developed model Precision:85, Recall:91
Shi et al. [36] 50 - SMS, Calls, Browser His-
tory, Location
- -
Table 3: Behavioral Profiling authentication methods. It contains the-state-of-the-art studies that conducted to
develop touch-based active authentication systems. Number of subjects depicts how many participants contributed
to the study. Dataset contains status of the collected data, private or public. Number of features that extracted
from the collected data. Classifiers that used in the classification process. Finally, the best results that achieved by
the developed method.
Gupta et al. [35] conducted several experiments
using large-scale data collection tool [42]. They
built a dataset that contains GPS location traces
and regular scans of WiFi and Bluetooth radio en-
vironments of a large number of users. They de-
veloped contexts of interest (CoIs: a context that
is significant to the user) identification algorithm.
They evaluated their proposed prototype on the col-
lected dataset which achieved Precision:85 and Re-
call:91.
Bassu et al. [34] developed a new behavioral
profiling authentication technique that combined
four essential behavioral elements corresponding to
what, where, when, and how. Apps usage consti-
tutes the what, location and pace of movement de-
fines where, clock time captures when, and gesture
or input-output interactions captures how. They
extracted set of features base on spatial and tem-
poral analysis. Then they developed a classification
model based on Bayesian classifier. Summary of the
proposed behavioral profiling authentication meth-
ods is shown in Table 3.
The main advantage of behavioral profiling bio-
metric authentication is the capability of providing
continuous and transparent authentication when
users interact with their mobile devices, where all
profile sensor data could be acquired continuously
and without interrupting the user. However, a ma-
jor weakness is the performance inconsistency when
users interact with the mobile phones in an unusual
way.
6.4. Gait recognition
Gait based active authentication systems identify
users based on the way in which the user walk. It is
one of the rare biometric traits that can be used to
recognize the people. With the diversity of built-in
sensors in smartphones such as accelerometer and
gyroscope made the development of authentication
systems based on this trait feasible.
Mantyjarvi et a. [47] proposed an implicit au-
thentication biometric method based on gait dy-
namics. They collected three-dimensional move-
ment data from 36 users via body worn 3-D ac-
celerometer device, where the users walked about
20 meter in their normal, fast and slow walking
speeds. The experimental results showed that the
best EER was 7% and achieved by means of a signal
correlation method. Rather than using stand alone
accelerometer devices, Derawi et al. [46] leverage
the low-energy accelerometer sensor in the mobile
device to collect accelerometer data from 51 sub-
jects. They created a dataset of 37 meters walking
distance with 40-50 samples per second for each of
the three directions x, y and z. They evaluated their
system based on the collected dataset and achieved
EER 20%. In addition to the accelerometer data,
Juefei-Xu et al. [45] used gyroscope data to esti-
mate the orientation of the phone in a user’s pocket.
They built a dataset with 36 subjects where they
walked for 166 feet (50.5 meter). They extracted
set of discriminative features based on Continuous
Wavelet Transform (CWT) [48]. The best result
achieved based on normal to normal pace which was
99.4% for verification rate at 0.1% for FAR.
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Study # of Sub-
jects
Dataset(# of sample) Platform Sensors Performance
(%)
Neverova et al. [43] 1500 Abacus(27.62 TB) Android Neural Net-
work
-
Hoang et al. [7] 38 Public [44] Android sequence of
prehensile
movements
FAR:0,
FRR≈16.81
Juefei-Xu et al. [45] 36 166f(50.5m) Android Accelerometer
and Gyro-
scope
VR: 99.4,
FAR:0.1
Derawi et al. [46] 51 37 Android Accelerometer
(AK8976A)
EER:20
Mantyjarvi et al. [47] 36 - 108/20m 3-D ac-
celerometer
EER:7
Table 4: Gait based authentication methods. It contains the-state-of-the-art studies that conducted to develop
gait-based active authentication systems. Number of subjects depicts how many participants contributed to the
study. Dataset contains status of the collected data, private or public. The platform Operating System in where the
study conducted. The sensors that have been used to collect the motion data. Finally, the best results that achieved
by the developed method.
Another novel idea has been proposed by Hoang
et al. [7] which verify the user via a stored key
which is biometrically encrypted by gait templates
collected from a mobile accelerometer. Also, they
investigated the discriminability of sensor-based
gait templates to construct an effective gait-based
biometric crypto-system. They created a dataset
from 38 participants using Google Nexus One de-
vice. They achieved zero FAR with approximately
16.18% FRR.
In contrast with all previous studies, Neverova
et al. [43] created unsupervised and unconstrained
dataset which was collected from approximately
1500 volunteers using LG Nexus 5 research phones
as their primary devices on a daily basis manner.
It is the largest study of its kind, where the motion
data acquired from three sensors: accelerometer,
gyroscope with 200 Hz sampling rate and magne-
tometer with 5 Hz sampling rate. They concen-
trated to authenticate users based on their natural
kinematics, the motion patterns of human body.
Their results demonstrated that human kinemat-
ics convey important information about user iden-
tity. Table 4 summarizes the results for all proposed
methods that built based on motion sensors.
Gait analysis relies on mobile inertial sensors
such accelerometers and gyroscopes for authenti-
cation. These sensors are non-contact and non-
obtrusive which could be used to design authen-
tication methods that resistant to spoofing attacks.
Figure 6: Decision level fusion on multiple behavioral
biometrics traits (i.e., gesture, keystrokes and behav-
ioral profiling)
7. Fusing Different Biometric Traits
Fusing different behavioral biometric traits can
improve the authentication accuracy and address
some limitations and problems as in section 8.
There are different scenarios could be applied to
perform the fusion which are as follows [49, 50, 51,
52, 53]:
1. Sensor level fusion, which combine raw data that
captured from different sensors for the same bio-
metric traits.
2. Feature-level fusion, which combine different fea-
ture vectors that extracted from multiple bio-
metric modalities in one new feature vector.
3. Score level fusion, which apply the combination
based on the matching score of each authentica-
tion modality.
4. Decision level fusion, comprises decisions from
multiple classifiers to make the final decision.
Figure 6 illustrates the combination of multiple
behavioral biometric traits based on decision level
fusion where the local decisions (i.e., calculated
based on each biometric trait) are combined based
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on the majority voting method [54]. The final de-
cision D is predicted based on the plurality vote of
each local decision dij as follows [55]:
D =
C
max
j
L∑
i=1
dij (5)
where j = {1, . . . , C} and C represents the dimen-
sion of classes (i.e., in authentication case is 0 or 1
which means accept or reject), and i = {1, . . . , L}
where L represents the number of modalities’ deci-
sions (i.e., three modalities as shown in Figure 6).
8. Limitations and Challenges
Although there are several advantages associ-
ated with the active authentication systems, there
are different limitations and problems are facing it
which are as follows [49, 50, 51, 56, 57]:
• Noisy data: the sensed data that recorded by
the sensors devices that used in active authenti-
cation systems is always affected by some level of
impreciseness in measurements.
• Non-universality: the active authentication
system may not be able to collect meaningful
data. In other words, the collected data might
not reflect the correct user behavior.
• Intra-class variations: incorrect interaction
with sensor, or the changing of the behavioral
characteristics of the users at different time in-
stances make variations.
• Lack of uniqueness: the interclass similarity
between individuals will make some difficulties
to differentiate between two users.
• Vulnerabilities: such as spoofing and robot at-
tacks. for example Serwadda et al. [57] developed
two Lego-driven robotic attacks on touch-based
authentication.
Although we could not cover all literature in ac-
tive authentication but we could cover an important
representative subset of the state-of-the-art meth-
ods. Based on these representative subset, there are
some challenges and future trends that needs to be
covered in the active authentication systems, which
are as follows:
• Maximizing accuracy: accuracy of active au-
thentication system that built based on behav-
ioral biometric traits is small. A better way to
maximize the accuracy is needed.
• Domain adaptation capability: user charac-
teristics change overtime. For instance, data col-
lected in the enrollment phase may differ than
those in the recognition phase. The active au-
thentication system should use some domain
adaptive method to handle this issue [58].
• Biometric feature extraction and selection:
feature extraction and selection are challenge
process by nature. To extract and select an ap-
propriate set of behavioral biometric features for
active authentication system are more challeng-
ing. In depth analysis on the collected data is
needed to select an appropriate set of behavioral
biometric features.
• Datasets: one of weakest point in the major-
ity of proposed active authentication systems is
the lack of real-world datasets. Conducting a
systematic user studies and experiments to get
more users involved are very important factor to
evaluate the active authentication system. The
majority of active authentication system is eval-
uated on small datasets that contains hundreds
of samples. Also, the availability of a public
dataset for active authentication system research
is needed [59].
• Usability: the usability of active authentication
systems is very important factor and needs to be
handled [60].
• Computation cost and energy consump-
tion: the capabilities of the smartphones are
lower than the desktop systems. So the com-
plexity cost should be considered in the design of
active authentication systems on smartphones.
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